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Non-technical Summary 
We examine variations in the South-North ratios (emerging vs. industrialized countries) of energy and 
labor intensities driven by imports. We use the novel World Input-Output Database (WIOD) that 
provides bilateral and bisectoral data for 40 countries and 35 sectors for 1995-2009. We find South-
North convergence of energy and labor intensities, an energy bias of import-driven convergence and 
no robust difference between imports of intermediate and investment goods. Accordingly, trade 
helps emerging economies follow a 'green growth' path, and trade-related policies can enhance this 
path. However, the effects are economically small and require a long time horizon to become 
effective. Trade-related policies can become much more effective in selected countries and sectors: 
China attenuates labor intensity via imports of intermediate goods above average. Brazil reduces 
energy intensity via imports of intermediate and investment goods above average. Production of 
machinery as an importing sector in emerging countries can immoderately benefit from trade-related 
reductions in factor intensities. Electrical equipment as a traded good particularly decreases energy 
intensity. Machinery particularly dilutes labor intensity. Our main results are statistically highly 
significant and robust across specifications.  
 
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Wir untersuchen Veränderungen der Süd-Nord-Raten (Schwellen- versus Industrieländer) von 
Energie- und Arbeitsintensitäten bedingt durch Importe. Wir verwenden den neuen WIOD-Datensatz 
(World Input-Output Database), der bilaterale und bisektorale Daten für 40 Länder und 35 Sektoren 
für die Jahre 1995-2009 bietet. Wir finden Süd-Nord-Konvergenz der Energie- und 
Arbeitsproduktivitäten, eine Ausrichtung der importgetriebenen Konvergenz in Richtung 
Energieproduktivität und keinen robusten Unterschied zwischen Importen in Form von 
Zwischenprodukten oder in Form von Investitionsgütern. Demzufolge kann Handel dazu beitragen, 
dass Schwellenländer einem „grünen“ Wachstumspfad folgen. Die Effekte sind allerdings klein und 
benötigen einen langen Zeithorizont um effektiv zu werden. Handelsspezifische Politiken können in 
bestimmten Ländern und Sektoren jedoch stärkere Wachstumseffekte generieren: China verringert 
die Arbeitsintensität der Produktion durch Importe von Zwischenprodukten überdurchschnittlich 
stark. Brasilien verringert die Energieintensität durch Importe von Investitionsgütern 
überdurchschnittlich stark. Die Herstellung von Maschinen kann in Schwellenländern besonders von 
handelsbedingten Produktivitätssteigerungen profitieren. Elektrische Geräte können als Importware 
insbesondere die Energieintensität verringern, Maschinen dagegen hauptsächlich die 
Arbeitsproduktivität. Unsere Hauptergebnisse sind statistisch hoch signifikant und robust gegenüber 
verschiedenen Spezifikationen. 
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1 Introduction
Whether the climate change challenge can be resolved via 'green growth' crucially depends on
the development of the emerging economies. The reduction of poverty and inequality depends
on (per-capita) income growth and distribution. The reduction of energy use depends on
energy productivity (eciency) gains. Both are driven by technical progress. Labor intensity
(the inverse of labor productivity) can be treated as a measure for general productivity
and thus the state of technology and for per capita income and thus the state of economic
development. Energy intensity (the inverse of energy productivity), can be treated as a
measure for resource eciency or the 'greenness' of the economy. A better understanding of
the development of these two indicators can thus help us predict whether emerging economies
are likely to follow a growth path that reconciles improvements in productivity and income
on the one hand, and resource eciency and decarbonization on the other hand.
In this context, international technology diusion from industrialized countries, say 'the
North', to emerging countries, say 'the South', is expected to reduce factor (energy and labor)
intensities. North-South technology spillovers can basically occur in a general disembodied
way or in an embodied way such that international trade and international investment are the
channel of technology transfer. For the choice of policy measures, it is particularly relevant
to examine embodied technology spillovers, more precisely via international trade. If we nd
strong technology spillovers associated with trade, trade related policy measures like taris
and quotas may also be eective.
Our analysis addresses a crucial question that has been neglected by the literature so far:
are international technology spillovers factor-biased, i.e. directed towards a production factor
such as energy or labor in the sense of Acemoglu (2002, 2010) and Acemoglu et al. (2012)?
{ In these models, endogenous technical change does not aect total factor productivity of
all sectors in the same neutral way. It aects dierent production factors (such as labor
and another factor) or sectors (such as clean and dirty production) to dierentiated extents
and can thus steer the economy onto diverse growth paths such as less labor intensive or
cleaner production. { Our paper is one of the rst econometric studies using the novel
WIOD (World Input Output Data) database. The WIOD database oers bilateral and
bisectoral trade ows for 40 countries and 35 sectors over 15 years. This allows us to to
set up a sectoral econometric model of South-North convergence and to run regressions
with a very large number of observations (up to almost 1.5 million). In particular, we
dene 31 industrialized countries (belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, OECD, or the European Union, EU) as source countries and 9 emerging
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economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and so forth) as recipient countries.
The novel idea of our econometric model is to dene source country-sector, recipient
country-sector quadruples. The dependent variable is the growth rate of the sectoral South-
North factor intensity ratio for each quadruple. The factors under scrutiny are energy in
comparison to labor. Each source-recipient country-sector quadruple is associated with a
corresponding bilateral trade ow. The traded goods under scrutiny are investment goods
in comparison to intermediate goods. The import intensity derived from these trade ows
is the explanatory variable of main interest. This research procedure goes beyond existing
analyses of this kind and generates new statistically signicant results.
In this analysis, we contrast the eects of investment goods imports to those of inter-
mediate goods imports. This is possible since WIOD provides the necessary information
whether imports from a specic country and sector go into the capital stock as an invest-
ment good or into a production sector as an intermediate good in each recipient country.
The expected mechanisms of technology spillovers dier: investment goods enter the capital
stock together with embodied technologies and hence raise the productivity of the (eective)
capital at work. This can be viewed as process innovation which directly enhances factor
productivity. Intermediate goods are included in or transformed into other goods in further
production processes. The technologies embodied in the intermediate goods improve the
quality of the further fabricated goods. This can be viewed as product innovation without a
direct impact on production. Nonetheless, the value of the fabricated goods relative to the
factor input will increase due to the quality improvement. Additionally, the embodied knowl-
edge can create spillovers through learning and the adaptation of production processes to
match the characteristics of the imported intermediate goods. In both cases, investment and
intermediate goods imports, trade is expected to be accompanied by enhanced cooperation
and knowledge ows between supplier and customer rms. Finally, in both cases, the trade
linkage is expected to be associated with activities of multi-national enterprises and foreign
direct investment which creates an enhanced knowledge ow between the aliate and parent
rms. These mechanisms are, however, expected to vary across source and recipient sectors
and countries. Notably, high-tech goods like electrical equipment are supposed to embody
more advanced knowledge than standard low-tech goods. Our analysis is to our knowledge
the rst that systematically examines these aspects.
We nd as our main result that trade-related North-South productivity (technology)
spillovers are directed towards energy (savings). We nd this eect for imported investment
and intermediate goods, but not for domestic investment goods. This shows that trade creates
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productivity gains via technology spillovers and possibly Melitz (2003) type productivity
gains. { In the Melitz (2003) model of heterogeneous rms, trade liberalization induces
exit of low-productivity rms and an expansion of the market share and the prots of high-
productivity rms engaged in exporting. This raises overall productivity and welfare. { This
corroborates the view that trade supports a 'green growth' path of developing countries.
However, the magnitude of this eect appears small so that trade-related policy measures
need a long time horizon to become eective. We identify source and recipient sectors and
recipient countries that are especially relevant for technology gains. Policy may pick these
sectors in order to raise the magnitude of productivity gains.
We structure our paper as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3.1 ex-
plains the underlying model and the theoretical background. Section 3.2. describes the
data. Section 3.3 explains the test and estimation procedures encompassing the main panel
estimations, the specic panel estimations (for selected source sectors, recipient sectors and
recipient countries) and the robustness checks (that include factor prices or research and de-
velopment expenditures and apply a dynamic model). Section 3.4 describes the results of the
various estimations set up in section 3.3. Section 3.5 summarizes the results and carries out
future extrapolations based on the results to illustrate the magnitude of the estimated eects.
Section 3.6 discusses robustness checks and caveats. Section 4 derives policy implications and
concludes.
2 Literature
During the last two decades an amazing number of papers on international technology
spillovers has been published (e.g. Coe et al., 1997, as one of the seminal papers on North-
South spillovers; for overviews see: Saggi, 2002; Keller, 2004; Havranek and Irsova, 2011).
The results are overall diverse and ambiguous regarding the signicance and strength of
international technology spillovers. Nonetheless, one can conclude that spillovers through
imports and foreign direct investment (FDI) inows exist.
In the work specically dealing with trade and the environment (Grossman and Krueger,
1993; Antweiler et al., 2001; Copeland and Taylor, 2003, as seminal contributions) the focus
is on pollutants like sulfur dioxide. The impact of trade on emissions is decomposed into a
scale eect (increased output augments emissions), a composition eect (sectoral changes can
augment or attenuate emissions per unit produced) and a technique eect (better technologies
and a higher environmental awareness with rising per capita income attenuate emissions per
unit produced). One can conclude from this literature that free trade improves environmental
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quality to a limited extent.
Due to the climate and energy challenge, the focus of the literature has then shifted to
energy and carbon dioxide intensity. Some papers address international spillovers aecting
energy or carbon intensity induced by imports or inward FDI (foreign direct investment) by
using country-level data (e.g. Cole, 2006; Perkins and Neumayer, 2009, 2012; Hubler and
Keller, 2010). The results are, however, ambiguous regarding the signicance and direction
of the eects on energy and carbon intensity.
Regionally more specic studies often focus on China and apply province- or city-level
data (e.g. Lai et al., 2006; Kuo and Yang, 2008). These China-specic studies suggest that
technology spillovers through imports and inward FDI contribute signicantly to Chinese
growth. Whereas these studies focus on productivity or economic growth, recent studies on
China examine various kinds of environmental aspects. Cole et al. (2011) nd that China's
economic growth in general amplies most air and water emissions, whereas rms from Hong
Kong, Macao and Taiwan exhibit a 'clean' exemption.
Studies that do not use detailed sectoral data have one shortcoming though: one can
hardly disentangle the technique eect and the composition eect of trade or FDI (except by
drawing on aggregate capital intensity as a proxy, cf. Cole, 2006). The former eect is the
one we are interested in when studying international spillovers. The latter eect means the
change in the sectoral structure which can aect the average economy-wide productivity.
Other studies do use sector-level data. Egger and Pfaermayr (2001), for example, nd
that inward FDI improves general and labor productivity in Australian manufacturing indus-
tries. A large number number of studies use rm-level data (e.g. Javorcik, 2004; Girma, 2005;
Girma and Gorg, 2007; Albornoz et al., 2009, on the dissemination of environmental manage-
ment systems; Keller and Yeaple, 2009). These studies demonstrate summa summarum that
productivity gains through inward FDI or multinational enterprises exist. Madsen (2007)
shows that trade-related knowledge spillovers were the main driver of total factor produc-
tivity convergence among OECD countries over the period 1870 to 2004. Because of data
availability restrictions, these studies often use data for selected OECD countries, not for de-
veloping countries. Papers focusing on specic developing countries improve on that (Aitken
and Harrison, 1999, on Venezuelan plants; Bwalya, 2006, on Zambian manufacturing rms;
Kohpaiboon, 2006, on Thai manufacturing plants; Amiti and Konings, 2007, on Indonesian
manufacturing plants; Suyanto and Bloch, 2009, on Indonesian chemical and pharmaceutical
plants; Seck, 2011, on a data set of 47 developing countries). These papers approve the exis-
tence of technology spillovers via imports and FDI inows. The results are country-specic
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though, whereas our results refer to a set of emerging economies that receive technological
knowledge and are hence more general.
Mayer-Foulkes and Nunnenkamp (2009), on the contrary, explore the impact of FDI on
South-North convergence for the United States as a source country with various recipient
countries. They identify FDI-related convergence of per-capita income with the USA for high-
income, but not for low-income countries. However, most studies look at FDI (or trade in
general), but not at imports used as intermediate goods inputs or as investment goods. Bitzer
and Geishecker (2006), for example, improve on that aspect by looking at intermediate goods
inputs and arm resulting technology spillovers. Yet there is lack of studies that use data on
imports of investment goods. Notably, these studies address productivity spillovers in general,
but not environmental issues, particularly represented by energy or carbon intensities.
On the contrary, studies that arm international convergence of energy intensities (e.g.
Markandya et al., 2006; Barassi et al., 2008; Jakob et al., 2011) leave it open whether
convergence is driven by trade, FDI or other factors.
R&D (research and development) as an original driver of technical progress is often not
included. Some studies that do apply sector-specic data on R&D expenditures do not take
trade and FDI explicitly into account (e.g. Grith, Redding and van Reenen, 2003, 2004).
Lee (2006), for example, expand on that by combining R&D and intermediate goods imports.
But these studies do not examine energy or carbon either. Addressing this aspect is dicult
or impossible, because so far there is no data on energy-related R&D data available on a
global scale including a large set of developing countries.
Carraro and De Cian (2013) are to our knowledge the only scholars who address factor-
specicity of technical change in the trade context. They also include R&D expenditures
available for thirteen OECD countries (ANBERD1 data). They nd that imports of machin-
ery and equipment reduce the input share of energy, whereas they do not signicantly aect
the input share of labor and that of capital either or only to a small extent. The hypothesis
that the impact of machinery and equipment imports on energy and capital is the same can
at least be rejected at the 10% signicance level. In contrast to Carraro and De Cian, we
utilize relative factor productivities instead of input shares as the dependent variable in a
North-South model. Additionally, we treat OECD countries as the sources of technological
knowledge and a set of emerging economies as the recipients. This allows us to scrutinize
South-North convergence of factor productivity. Furthermore, we utilize various types of
imported goods, not only machinery and equipment. Following Carraro and De Cian, we run
1http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=18063.
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a robustness check including the ANBERD R&D expenditures for industrialized countries,
whereas R&D data are missing for the emerging economies.
In summary, the literature leaves the following notable aspects open that we address in
our analysis: rst, to our knowledge, no econometric study has examined the direction (bias)
of trade-related South-North convergence towards labor or energy (in the sense of directed
technical change a la Acemoglu, 2002, and Acemoglu et al., 2012). Second, to our knowledge,
no econometric study has compared imports used as an investment good with imports used
as an intermediate input. Third, the literature has to our knowledge not yet examined how
technology spillovers dier across the type of the traded goods and the recipient sectors
and countries. Fourth, to our knowledge, there is no study that combines a large country
dimension with a large sector dimension { for source and recipient countries { and a time
dimension. Fifth, we introduce a novel model specication, in which the sectoral South-
North ratio of factor productivity is the dependent variable. These aspects allow us to study
factor-specic South-North convergence and its country- and sector-specic facets, exploiting
a large number of observations. The model specication will be detailed in the following part.
3 Analysis
We set up an innovative econometric model that includes bilateral trade between distinct
sectors and countries and corresponding energy and labor intensities. We eliminate the scale
eect (increased output augments emissions) by computing all variables in intensity form.
We dene the model at the sector level so that the composition eect (sectoral changes can
augment or attenuate emissions per unit produced) is taken into account and we are left
with measuring the technique eect (better technologies and a higher environmental aware-
ness with rising per capita income attenuate emissions per unit produced). We take into
account disembodied and embodied spillovers. Herein, we compare the impact of imports
used as an investment good to the impact of imports used as an intermediate input. In the
former case, we hypothesize that advanced machinery and equipment imported from abroad
enter the productive capital stock via investment and raise productivity. In the latter case, we
hypothesize that the embodied technological knowledge not only improves the quality of the
produced goods but also the productivity of the underlying production processes. Moreover,
we hypothesize that productivity gains from trade through rm selection exist (as demon-
strated theoretically by Melitz, 2003, in a model of heterogeneous rms2). Overall, the high
2In the Melitz (2003) model, trade liberalization induces exit of low-productivity rms and and an expansion
of the market share and the prots of high-productivity rms engaged in exporting. This raises overall
productivity and welfare.
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sectoral resolution provides clearer results than a crude country-level analysis using aggregate
trade and more general results than a one-country analysis { as usually done in the literature.
Importantly, we also compare the results for energy and for labor intensity to identify the
direction of technology diusion. This distinction is important when considering climate and
energy issues and poverty and development issues in a joint way. We also compare the eect
of imported investment goods to the eect of domestically produced investment goods. We
hypothesize that imported investment goods generate productivity gains that domestically
produced ones do to generate. Thus, in our analysis, we carry out three comparisons: energy
versus labor, intermediates versus investment, foreign versus domestic, in which we always
apply the same model specication. If the estimated coecients depend on the econometric
specication, we will still be able to detect dierences in a consistent way. This is another
strength of our paper.
The novel WIOD (World Input Output Data) database allows us to carry out a detailed
country- and sector-specic analysis, including energy and labor inputs, that goes beyond
existing studies. Since 40 countries and 35 source are covered over 15 years, we can run
regressions with a very large number of observations (up to 1,483,371 in our regressions).
We split the country sample into 31 source and 9 recipient countries and create subsamples
of 14 manufacturing sectors and one investment good sector as recipient sectors. Countries
and sectors are interconnected via bilateral and bisectoral trade ows. This means, a good
(commodity or service) is transferred from a sector j in country s to a sector i in country r.
The database does not cover a large number of developing countries, but it does cover the
main emerging economies which are the main future carbon emitters: China, India, Russia,
Brazil and Indonesia. Besides, it covers Bulgaria, Mexico, Romania and Taiwan. And it
covers manufacturing sectors such as machinery and equipment that are expected to create
technology spillovers. We also make use of the advantage that WIOD provides all required
variables without any need to add external data that may not t to the sectoral resolution.
In this sense, we use one consistent data set.
The following subsections provide the theoretical background in form of a simplied,
stylized model in 3.1, our data set in 3.2, our test and estimation procedures in 3.3, the
main, specic and robustness check results in 3.4, a summary and a prediction in 3.5 and a
critical discussion in 3.6. Tables 1, 2 and 3 introduce the notation that we use.
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3.1 Model setup
We scrutinize South-North convergence in energy and in labor intensities and their drivers,
particularly education (absorptive capacity) and trade (imports).
t Time period 15 years, f1995, 1996, ..., 2009g
s Source country 31 industrialized countries
r Recipient country 9 emerging economies,
fBrazil, Bulgaria, China, India, Indonesia,
Mexico, Romania, Russia, Taiwang
u Source country 24 industrialized countries, subset of s
j Source sector 35 sectors (covering agriculture, industry and services)
i Recipient sector m or k
m Manufacturing sector 14 recipient sectors, subset of i
k Investment (capital) good 1 economy-wide sector as an input to all destination
sectors, subset of i
l Source sector 21 sectors, subset of j
Table 1: Sets.
Y Output value in mill. 1995-US$
F Factor input in physical units; F = fE;Lg
E Energy input in Terajoule
L Labor (work) input in mill. working hours
H High-skilled labor input in mill. working hours
X Trade value in mill. 1995-US$
0 Overall constant eect
1;srji Source and recipient country- and sector-specic eect
2;t Time-specic eect
Table 2: Variables.
We build on the approach by Nelson and Phelps (1966) who state that the change in
technology increases in education (human capital) and in the technology gap (originally the
distance to the technology frontier) in a proportional fashion. As a result, technological
laggard economies or sectors catch up faster in terms of technology than those close to the
leading technology level. This results in a convergence process. We also follow Findlay
(1978) who add investment ows between countries as an additional determinant of technical
progress. Dierent from the literature, we look at the change in the South-North technology
gap over time. For this purpose, we set up the following model:
Frit
Yrit
Fsjt
Ysjt
= e0+1;srji+2;t 
0@ Fri(t 1)Yri(t 1)
Fsj(t 1)
Ysj(t 1)
1A0  Hr(t 1)
Lr(t 1)
1


Xsrji(t 1)
Yri(t 1)
2
; F = fE;Lg (1)
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On the left hand side, the model explains the relative sector- and country-specic factor
intensity in period t that diers from that in t   1 on the right hand side. Relative means
recipient (destination) country r and recipient sector i relative to source country s and source
sector j. The factors F under examination are energy E and labor L. This means, the
equation can be alternatively written for energy or for labor. The relative factor intensity
represents a technology gap between sectors: the smaller the relative factor intensity, the
smaller is the South-North technology gap. We measure the factors relative to output Y ,
i.e. in intensity form. Technology transfer is expected to narrow the technology gap so
that the relative factor intensity is expected to decline over time. In general, we measure
the factor intensity in any recipient country sector i relative to any source country sector
j. This means, we compare sectors with in general dierent production technologies. Thus,
their factor intensities naturally dier. Nonetheless, we are interested in the change of such
cross-sectoral factor intensities over time. We do not look at cross-sectoral factor intensities
themselves at any point of time. (When imports are used as an investment good in the
following analysis, there will only be one recipient sector, investment, and recipient factor
intensities will be measured recipient economy-wide.) We examine whether the South-North
technology gap under scrutiny changes over time and why. In other words, we ask the
question whether the data show international convergence in factor intensities over time and
what the drivers are. We cannot directly infer whether recipient country factor intensities rise
or fall in absolute terms though. However, if we know from descriptive statistics that factor
intensities have declined in the Northern countries and our model shows that the South-
North technology gap has on average declined, we will also know that factor intensities have
on average declined in the Southern countries in absolute terms.
On the right hand side, the model lists the determinants of the change in the relative
factor intensity, particularly high-skilled labor H and trade X from sj to ri. Both are
measured in intensity form, relative to total labor L or output Y respectively. Herein, we
assume for the moment that all determinants on the right hand side have an eect on the
left hand side with a one-period time lag.
First, we assume that there is an autonomous driver of convergence denoted by 0 that
is common for all countries and sectors. 0 is the constant overall annual growth rate.
1;srji is the annual growth rate of the (source and destination) sector- and country-specic
autonomous driver. It represents a trade-specic eect: there is one individual eect for each
source country and sector interacting with each destination country and sector, i.e. for each
(srji)-quadruple. 2;t captures any time varying processes not captured by the model.
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Second, the relative factor intensity in period t is supposed to depend upon the relative
factor intensity of the previous period t 1 as explained above. This implies path dependency
of factor intensity.
Third, we assume that education (human) capital is an important country-specic driver
of convergence. We measure education (absorptive capacity) as the economy-wide high-skilled
labor share in all labor (in terms of working hours)
Hr(t 1)
Lr(t 1)
. High-skilled labor means rst
stage and second stage of tertiary education (1997 ISCED levels 5 and 6). Education can (a)
directly support convergence since workers with better education and skills are supposed to
be more productive in terms of labor productivity. They might also have better managerial
skills that help improve overall eciency and energy eciency of production. Education
can (b) indirectly support convergence when it is treated as a measure for the absorptive
capacity. It then represents factors like infrastructure, the legal system, access to media etc.
It can in this sense support embodied spillovers, brought about by the following driver.
Fourth, international trade in terms of imports used for investment or imports used as
intermediate inputs is the driver of main interest. We measure it relative to the destination
country production value in each destination sector as
Xsrji(t 1)
Yri(t 1)
. We expect that a higher
import intensity lowers the relative factor intensity. We (a) expect that trade intensies
competition and rm selection resulting in increased productivity in the Melitz (2003) sense.
While one might rst think of nal products in this context, we only consider competition
and rm selection in intermediate goods and investment goods markets in an implicit way
in this analysis. Most importantly, we (b) expect that trade enhances embodied interna-
tional technology spillovers as summarized by Saggi (2002) and Keller (2004). Regarding
investment goods, we suppose that for example new electrical equipment embodies superior
new technologies. Regarding intermediate inputs, we suppose that for example the delivery
of new electric circuits is accompanied by information on how to to integrate them in nal
products. Hence, we expect that the way they are technically integrated in nal products
changes compared to the past. This implies process innovation additionally to product inno-
vation. As a result, not only the quality of products improves but also the eciency of the
underlying production processes. We expect a positive interaction between education (ab-
sorptive capacity), the technology gap and imports (cf. Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Findlay,
1978).
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3.2 Data description
We use the novel WIOD (World Input Output Data) database throughout the analysis.
The WIOD project has been funded by the European Commission, Directorate General
Research, as part of the 7th Framework Programme, Theme 8: Socio-Economic Sciences
and Humanities. WIOD has been available for the public since April 2012.3 It is to our
knowledge the rst database that provides bilateral and bisectoral input-output relations
for a number of years as well as environmental indicators within one consistent data set.
The full input-output table provides 1,483,371 observations. We divide the full data set
into 31 source countries4 s and 9 recipient countries5 r, 35 source sectors6 j, 14 recipient
manufacturing sectors7 m and one recipient investment good sector8 k as well as 15 years
(1995 until 2009). t. Although the industrialized countries covered by WIOD (listed in the
footnote) do not perfectly match the OECD member state list in 2013 nor the OECD plus
the EU member state list in 2013, we will for simplicity refer to them as OECD countries
throughout the paper. Inversely, we will refer to the nine emerging countries covered by
WIOD as non-OECD countries for simplicity of the terminology.
Within the WIOD database, we take data on imports of intermediate goods and in-
vestment goods and domestically produced investment goods from the World Input-Output
Tables (WIOTs). We take data on working hours, output, high-skilled labor shares9 and
price indices used to deate variables from the Socioeconomic Accounts (SEAs). We take
3http://www.wiod.org/database/.
41. Australia, 2. Austria, 3. Belgium, 4. Canada, 5. Cyprus, 6. Czech Republic, 7. Denmark, 8. Estonia,
9. Finland, 10. France, 11. Germany, 12. Greece, 13. Hungary, 14. Ireland, 15. Italy, 16. Japan, 17. Korea,
18. Latvia, 19. Lithuania, 20. Luxembourg, 21. Malta, 22. Netherlands, 23. Poland, 24. Portugal, 25.
Slovak Republic, 26. Slovenia, 27. Spain, 28. Sweden, 29. Turkey, 30. United Kingdom, 31. United States of
America.
51. Brazil, 2. Bulgaria, 3. China, 4. India, 5. Indonesia, 6. Mexico, 7. Romania, 8. Russia, 9. Taiwan.
61. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing, 2. Mining and Quarrying, 3. Food, Beverages and Tobacco,
4. Textiles and Textile Products, 5. Leather, Leather and Footwear, 6. Wood and Products of Wood and
Cork, 7. Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing, 8. Coke, Rened Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel, 9. Chemicals
and Chemical Products, 10. Rubber and Plastics, 11. Other Non-Metallic Minerals, 12. Basic Metals and
Fabricated Metal, 13. Machinery, NEC, 14. Electrical and Optical Equipment, 15. Transport Equipment,
16. Manufacturing, NEC, Recycling, 17. Electricity, Gas and Water Supply, 18. Construction, 19. Sale,
Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles, Retail Sale of Fuel, 20. Wholesale Trade and
Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles, 21. Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles
and Motorcycles, Repair of Household Goods, 22. Hotels and Restaurants, 23. Inland Transport, 24. Water
Transport, 25. Air Transport, 26. Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities, Activities of Travel
Agencies, 27. Post and Telecommunications, 28. Financial Intermediation, 29. Real Estate Activities, 30.
Renting of M&E and Other Business Activities, 31. Public Admin and Defense, Compulsory Social Security,
32. Education, 33. Health and Social Work, 34. Other Community, Social and Personal Services, 35. Private
Households with Employed Persons.
71. Food, Beverages and Tobacco, 2. Textiles and Textile Products, 3. Leather, Leather and Footwear, 4.
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork, 5. Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing, 6. Coke, Rened
Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel, 7. Chemicals and Chemical Products, 8. Rubber and Plastics, 9. Other Non-
Metallic Minerals, 10. Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal, 11. Machinery, NEC, 12. Electrical and Optical
Equipment, 13. Transport Equipment, 14. Manufacturing, NEC, Recycling.
8The investment good adds to the recipient economy-wide capital stock used for production in any sector
of the recipient country.
9High-skilled labor means rst and second stage of tertiary education (1997 ISCED levels 5 and 6).
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data on total energy use from the Environmental Accounts (EAs).
The variables of main interest are factor (energy and labor) intensity FtYt ; F = fE;Lg,
high-skilled labor intensity HtLt , and import (investment and intermediate input) intensity
Xt
Yt
.
The country and sector indexes are left out here because Figure 1 (a{c) plots these variables
as cross-sectional averages over the 31 industrialized source countries and sectors, denoted
by 'OECD', and averages over the 9 emerging recipient countries and sectors, denoted by
'non-OECD', for the time horizon 1995 to 2009 which WIOD covers.10 Figure 1 (d) plots
trade ows from aggregate OECD to aggregate non-OECD. For this purpose, the bilateral,
bisectoral trade ows are summed up over source as well as recipient countries and sectors
and expressed in relation to total recipient GDP (gross domestic product). Apparently,
energy intensity is much higher in the non-OECD region than in the OECD region. Energy
intensity fell in both regions, but to a much stronger extent in the non-OECD region as
shown in Figure 1 (a). This illustrates that a tendency of South-North convergence exists.
However, the data also show that the South-North ratio of energy intensity, i.e. relative
energy intensity ErtYrt =
Est
Yst
, fell to a minor extent from about 3.2 in 1995 to 3.1 in 2009.
Similarly, Figure 1 (b) reveals a much higher labor intensity in the non-OECD than
in the OECD region and South-North convergence. Dierent from energy intensity, labor
intensity stayed almost constant in OECD and fell to a larger extent than energy intensity
in non-OECD. The data show that the South-North ratio of labor intensity, i.e. relative
labor intensity LrtYrt =
Lst
Yst
, clearly fell from about 22.3 in 1995 to 15.1 in 2009. This means,
the South-North productivity gap is much larger for labor than for energy, and the speed of
closing the gap has been much larger for labor than for energy too. This is in accordance
with classical theory like Nelson and Phelps (1966) suggesting that catching up is faster the
larger the initial technology gap is.
Figure 1 (c) depicts the rise in high-skilled labor intensity as an indicator for eduction
and absorptive capacity (in terms of absorbing technological knowledge) in both regions.
The OECD high-skilled intensity rose from 18.9% in 1995 to 27.5% in 2009. The non-OECD
high-skilled intensity rose from 8.9% in 1995 to 13.4% in 2005. Nevertheless, the South-North
ratio of the high-skilled intensity improved only slightly from 0.47 to 0.49 within this time
frame.
Nonetheless, only a rigorous statistical analysis can take into account sectoral dierences,
country-specic eects and specic drivers of convergence. Only a sectoral analysis can
disentangle the technique eect from the (sectoral) composition eect. One of the drivers
10The sum of OECD energy use divided by the sum of OECD GDP (gross domestic product)). The same
for non-OECD.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1: Historical time paths computed from WIOD for the aggregate regions of 31 indus-
trialized countries (mostly OECD countries) and 9 emerging countries (mostly non-OECD
countries) as averages over countries and sectors. (a) Energy intensity (energy input to GDP)
Et
Yt
; (b) Labor intensity (labor input to GDP) LtYt ; (c) High-skilled labor intensity (share of
high-skilled working hours in all working hours) HtLt ; (d) Import intensity (imports used for
investment and imports used as intermediate inputs) XtYt .
is presumably international trade as visualized by Figure 1 (d). The gure depicts trade
ows from OECD to non-OECD in both graphs.11 The upper graph looks at trade in
products used as intermediate inputs in non-OECD manufacturing sectors in intensity form.
Accordingly, the intensity of intermediate goods imports fell from 6.4% of GDP to 4.7% in
the rst half of the time frame and rose to 7.9% in the second half. The intensity of imports
used as investment goods depicted in the lower graph, on the contrary, slightly fell from
0.9% to about 0.6 % of GDP in the rst half and then stabilized around that percentage
number. This means that the import intensity did not clearly rise within the time frame
as one might expect. This, however, does not contradict our hypothesis of international
productivity spillovers via imports. The model that we set up in the previous section states
that a positive import share in a certain period inuences the South-North technology gap in
the following period (and thereafter via the lagged dependent variable). Thus, a contribution
11The value of trade from OECD to non-OECD divided by non-OECD GDP.
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of trade to convergence does not require that the import share is intensied over time, it just
requires that the trade intensity is positive (and not zero).
Notwithstanding, the gures might depict a kind of spurious correlation. Thus, we carry
out unit root tests for panel data. Herein, we focus on the Fisher-type Augmented Dickey
Fuller test for unit roots in panel data (based on Dickey and Fuller, 1979). Additionally, we
apply the Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) test. In accordance with other studies (e.g. Hubler and
Keller, 2010), the tests indicate a unit root in energy intensity. The same is true for labor
intensity. We resolve this problem by using relative factor intensity (the South-North ratio
of energy or labor intensity) as the dependent variable which is not subject to a unit root.
The other variables, import intensity and high-skilled labor intensity, do not have unit roots
according to the test results.
Table 8 in the Appendix summarizes the descriptive statistics for our main variables.
Energy intensity EY , labor intensity
L
Y and high-skilled intensity
H
L are reported for OECD
source countries s and non-OECD recipient countries r, both with the time (year) index t.
Trade intensities XY represent ows from OECD to non-OECD at the sector level so that each
trade ow has the index srjkt or srjmt whereas the output value referring to the destination
country and sector has the index rit. Looking at manufacturing sectorsm as recipient sectors
results in a larger number of observations than looking at the investment good k only. In
the former case, the data are computed sector-wise, in the latter case, economy-wise. For
source countries, the intensities are reported including all sectors, i.e. at the country level.
For recipient countries, they are reported for all sectors as well as for manufacturing sectors
only.
It is visible in Table 8 in the Appendix that non-OECD countries have on average a higher
energy and labor intensity and a higher variance in these variable than OECD countries.12
On the opposite, they have on average a lower high-skilled labor intensity and therein a lower
variance than OECD countries. The average high-skilled labor intensity of OECD countries
over time is 2.1 times that of non-OECD countries. This reects a higher average education
and technology and thus productivity level in OECD countries. Within non-OECD countries,
manufacturing sectors have on average a higher energy intensity, a lower labor intensity and
a lower high-skilled intensity than all sectors have on average. This points to a more intensive
use of machinery in manufacturing which replaces labor but uses energy. At the same time,
there are more labor-intensive activities in manufacturing that demand low-skilled labor.
12The high maximum of manufacturing energy intensities on a sectoral level comes from 'Inland Transport'
in Russia. While Russia's energy intensity is in general about 2.5 to 3 times higher than that of China or
India, the energy intensity in this particular sector is even higher.
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We compute three-year moving averages of all data used in the regressions in order to
mitigate outliers and possible endogeneity problems due to measurement errors and factors
outside the model that simultaneously inuence an explanatory and the dependent variable.
Endogeneity due to omitted variables (factor productivity has various possible determinants
for which no data covering the countries, sectors and years in our model are available) will in
general be addressed by xed eects and more specically by the inclusion of R&D expendi-
tures and factor prices in the robustness check. Notably, we dene the dependent variable as
a South-North ratio. This has an important advantage with respect to endogeneity: if the
labor (or energy) productivity of the South is inversely proportional to per capita income
and hence the state of economic development, the high-skilled labor, import and investment
intensity are { following straightforward economic reasoning { supposed to be dependent
on the state of economic development and hence endogenous. This eect is tackled or at
least mitigated through the denition of the dependent variable as the sectoral growth rate
of the South-North ratio of factor intensity. It is for example not straightforward that the
high-skilled labor intensity depends on this sectoral, relative measure.
Tables 9 and 10 in the Appendix show the correlation matrix for the investment good
sample and the manufacturing sectors sample respectively. The latter sample is larger than
the former because it distinguishes more recipient sectors. The matrices show that all corre-
lations are low so that there is no collinearity problem.
In a robustness check, we will also use data from ANBERD (Analytical Business Enter-
prise Research and Development).13 The sectoral coverage is reduced to 21 sectors14 denoted
by l because some sectors are summed up in ANBERD. The country coverage is additionally
reduced to 24 source countries15 denoted by u.
In another robustness check, we will use factor prices. Since factor prices are not directly
provided by WIOD, we construct them by dividing factor input quantities in currency value
form (1995-US$) by input quantities in physical units (number of working hours or Joule).
Labor input in working hours is available in WIOD, whereas the energy input in value form
is not directly available. Hence, we make the assumption that intermediate inputs from the
13http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANBERD2011_REV3.
141. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing, 2. Mining and Quarrying, 3. Food, Beverages and Tobacco,
4. Textiles and Textile Products, 5. Leather, Leather and Footwear, 6. Wood and Products of Wood and
Cork, 7. Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing, 8. Coke, Rened Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel, 9. Chemicals
and Chemical Products, 10. Rubber and Plastics, 11. Other Non-Metallic Minerals, 12. Basic Metals and
Fabricated Metal, 13. Machinery, NEC, 14. Electrical and Optical Equipment, 15. Transport Equipment, 16.
Manufacturing, NEC, Recycling, 17. Electricity, Gas and Water Supply, 18. Construction, 19. Hotels and
Restaurants, 20. Financial Intermediation, 21. Other Community, Social and Personal Services.
151. Australia, 2. Austria, 3. Belgium, 4. Canada, 5. Czech Republic, 6. Germany, 7. Spain, 8. Estonia,
9. Finland, 10. France, 11. Great Britain, 12. Greece, 13. Hungary, 14. Ireland, 15. Italy, 16. Japan, 17.
Korea, 18. Netherlands, 19. Poland, 20. Portugal, 21. Slovak Republic, 22. Slovenia, 23. Turkey, 24. United
States.
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sectors coal, lignite and peat; crude petroleum and natural gas; services incidental to oil
and gas extraction excluding surveying; coke, rened petroleum products and nuclear fuels;
electrical energy, gas, steam and hot water taken from the National Supply and Use Tables
(SUTs) represent energy use. Computing the share of these energy inputs in all inputs and
multiplying by total expenditure on inputs yields the required energy input value. These
constructed price measures are, however, only an approximation of real prices.16
3.3 Estimation strategy
This subsection explains our estimation strategy. Table 3 depicts the notation used in the
econometric model.
In order to simplify the notation, we write: RFYsrjit := ln

Frit
Yrit
=
Fsjt
Ysjt

, HLrt := ln

Hrt
Lrt

,
and XYsrjit := ln

Xsrjit
Yrit

, and add an error term "srjit that includes all disturbances not
captured by the model. Taking logs of Equation (1) and using this notation results in the
following log   log specication:
RFYsrjit = 0 + 0 RFYsrji(t 1) + 1 HLr(t 1) + 2 XYsrji(t 1) + "srjit (2)
We recall that s denotes source countries, r recipient countries, j source sectors, i recipient
sectors, and t time (years). We estimate this dynamic model for F = fE;Lg, i.e. for relative
energy and labor intensity excluding the xed eects 1;srji and 2;t.
RFYsrjit Logarithm of factor intensity, recipient relative to source; F = fE;Lg
HLrt Logarithm of high-skilled labor intensity, recipient
XYsrjit Logarithm of international trade ow relative to recipient output value
DYrt Logarithm of domestic investment goods intensity, recipient
IYslnt Logarithm of R&D intensity, source
PFrmt Logarithm of factor price measure
0 Overall constant
1;srji Source and recipient country- and sector-specic xed eect
2;t Time-specic eect
n n
th coecient to be estimated
"srjit Error term
Table 3: Symbols of the econometric model.
16Due to missing data, Romania is left out in the energy price sample and in the robustness check regression
based on that.
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3.3.1 Main estimation
In order to derive the static model used in our main estimations, we assume 0 = 1 and
subtract 0RFYsrji(t 1) on both sides.17 Then on the left hand side, RFYsrji(t 1) =
RFYsrjit   RFYsrji(t 1) describes the growth rate of the relative factor intensity within
period t   1. We then write the model for RFYsrjit = RFYsrji(t+1)   RFYsrjit instead of
RFYsrji(t 1) to simplify the notation. We expect a time lag between the inow of goods
and their impact on the relative productivity because the technology diusion requires time.
In particular, we assume a three-year time lag (for a discussion see section 3.5). We arrive at
the following static dlog   log specication for F = fE;Lg with individual and time-specic
eects:
RFYsrjit = 0 + 1;srji + 2;t + 1 HLr(t 3) + 2 XYsrji(t 3) + "srjit (3)
We structure our estimation procedure as follows:
We always look at the industrialized (OECD and EU) countries s as source countries and
the emerging (non-OECD) countries r as recipient countries.
Our rst set of regressions, denoted by K looks at the investment (capital) good k as
the single destination sector i. We focus on the investment good because we expect that
especially products that enter the capital stock, such as new machinery, bring about new
technologies and thus productivity gains. In this case, the recipient factor intensity is the
economy-wide one because we only know the total economy-wide investment volume, not the
sectoral investment volume from the data. In the same manner, the high-skilled labor share
is the economy-wide share. Source sectors encompass all sectors j.
The second set denoted by M looks at all manufacturing sectors m as recipient sectors
i. We focus on manufacturing sectors because we expect that manufacturing rms can most
likely deploy the technological knowledge embodied in intermediate goods. Source sectors
encompass again all sectors j. In this case, the high-skilled labor share refers to manufacturing
sectors only. Factor intensities are now measured at the sector level.
The rst subset of regressions denoted by E uses energy productivity, the second subset,
denoted by L, uses labor productivity. We estimate each set and subset with the static model
lain out by Equation (3):
Estimation 1: We estimate the basic static model in Equation (3) as it stands. We carry
out an F -test for xed eects versus pooled regression. The null hypothesis of all xed eects
17As we will see in the dynamic estimations in the robustness check, the estimated value of 0 is only slightly
below one.
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being zero is rejected so that we choose a specication with individual eects as given by
Equation (3). Moreover, we carry out a Hausman test for xed versus random eects. The
null hypothesis of consistent random eects is rejected for our dierent specications so that
we choose xed eects. In all the regressions we run, we carry out standard F -tests for the
null hypothesis of all coecients jointly being zero, which is always clearly rejected with
p-values very close to zero. We always report adjusted R2 values too. We report robust
standard errors.
Estimation 2: We add the total value of domestically produced (within-country) in-
vestment goods relative to GDP, i.e. 3  DYr(t 3), for each recipient country in the static
regression. Herein, domestic investment goods are measured economy-wide. By doing this,
we intend to check whether the inuence of investment goods from abroad is signicantly
dierent from the inuence of domestic investment goods. If so, this points to embodied
technology spillovers or increased competition and rm selection via trade.
Estimation 3: We leave out domestic investment goods but include the relative factor
intensity 5 RFYri(t 3) as a regressor. Now we want to know whether the past relative factor
intensity of a country leads to a change in the relative factor intensity today in the sense
of a convergence process. Following convergence theory (cf. Nelson and Phelps, 1966) we
expect that a higher past factor intensity results in a stronger reduction in the relative factor
intensity today. This static specication comes close to our dynamic model in Equation (2).
The rst dierence is that in Equation (2) the relative factor intensity RFYsrjit appears
as the dependent variable instead of the change in the relative factor intensity denoted by
RFYsrjit. The second dierence is that RFYri(t 3) now appears with a one-period lag
instead of a three-period lag as a regressor.
Estimation 4: We are interested in the interaction of imports with the absorptive capacity
and with the existing relative factor intensity. This leads to the interaction term 6 HLr(t 3) 
XYsrji(t 3) RFYri(t 3) in the static model and with a one-period lag (t  1) in the dynamic
model.
This yields 2 x 2 x 4 static regressions S. In the robustness check explained below we
will additionally specify 1 x 2 x 2 dynamic regressions D. Regression (SME1) for example
denotes the basic static model looking at intermediate goods and energy intensity. Regression
(DKL3) for example denotes the dynamic model without the interaction term looking at the
investment good and labor intensity.
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3.3.2 Specic estimation
To identify cross-section heterogeneity, we select machinery and equipment sectors as single
source sectors, and dierent energy- or labor-intensive recipient sectors thereafter, both based
on regression (2). Additionally, we will look at the BRIC-countries (Brazil, Russia, India
and China) as single recipient countries based on regression (1). The aim of these specic
estimations is not to check the robustness of the results, but to scrutinize the heterogeneity
of spillover eects across countries and sectors and to identify prevailing patterns.
First, we examine source country heterogeneity with respect to the creation of technology
spilllovers. We estimate the static model (SK.2 and SM.2) including domestic investment
goods as a separate regressor for E and L for selected source sectors j. In particular, we
choose the manufacturing sectors 'Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal', 'Machinery, Nec',
'Electrical and Optical Equipment' and 'Transport Equipment' as single source sectors. These
sectors produce machinery and equipment used as investment goods, and we expect that
these investment goods are in particular associated with international technology diusion.
Herein, it is our aim to identify which source sectors are in particular relevant for catching up
through technology transfer. For comparison, we also estimate the eects of these goods if
they are used as intermediate inputs. This appears straightforward since fabricated material,
machinery and equipment can also create productivity gains when they are further fabricated,
for example due to information provided together with the equipment.
Second, we want to detect which recipient sectors are in particular able to catch up
through technology transfer. These sectors could be supported by policy measures with
priority. For this purpose, we estimate the static model (SM.2) with intermediate goods
imports including domestic investment goods as a separate regressor for E and L for selected
recipient sectors m. In particular, we choose the manufacturing sectors 'Textiles and Textile
Products', 'Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing', 'Chemicals and Chemical Products' and
'Machinery, Nec' as single recipient sectors. 'Textiles and Textile Products' is a sector where
manual work and imports of raw material play an important role in countries like China.
'Pulp and Paper', although not 'Printing and Publishing', and 'Chemicals and Chemical
Products' are typical energy-intensive sectors. 'Machinery' is not a typical energy-intensive,
nor a typical labor-intensive sector, whereas intermediate inputs like metal products might
generate productivity gains in this sector.
Third, we run our static regressions for selected destination countries, i.e. for the BRIC-
countries, Brazil, Russia, India and China, in order to detect recipient country heterogeneity.
In these regressions, we apply the basic static model (1) represented by Equation (3). We
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need to leave out the high-skilled share and the intensity of domestic investment goods
because the data exhibit small variation over time when looking at a single recipient country.
Nonetheless, we include individual and time-specic eects as before. Once again, we run
the regressions looking at energy versus labor intensity and at investment good use versus
intermediate good use.
3.3.3 Robustness check
As a rst robustness check, we will estimate Equation (2) excluding xed eects srji by
applying dynamic panel estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995;
Blundell and Bond, 1998; xtabond2 by Roodman, 2009a, in Stata). We keep the original
model specication with one-period time lags which is the common specication of a dynamic
model. Our GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) type estimation addresses 'Nickel bias'
(Nickel, 1982) and others kinds of endogeneity (omitted variable bias, measurements errors
and simultaneity as discussed in section 3.2). We apply the two-step method and reduce
the instrument count (cf. Roodman, 2009b), i.e. time lags, and restrict the instrumentation
to instruments in levels with the aim to fulll the Sargan/Hansen J-test for overidentifying
restrictions (the null hypothesis of joint validity of all instruments). We also apply the
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation (AR(1) and AR(2)). It turns out that due to the very
large cross-section but relatively small time series of the data, it is dicult to nd a valid
dynamic specication that fullls the J- and AR-test. This is especially true for the larger
sample with manufacturing sectors as recipient sectors. Hence, we report only the results for
the smaller investment good sample. We rely in general more on the static estimations. The
dynamic estimation is nevertheless important for better understanding the dynamic behavior
with respect to convergence and to address endogeneity in a robustness check.
We will run two more robustness checks that insert further control variables into the static
model. Factor prices, i.e. wages and energy prices, are closely related to factor productivity
following basic economic reasoning. This involves two problems though: data availability
and endogeneity. Regarding data availability, the required prices are not directly provided
by WIOD, but constructed as detailed in section 3.2. Regarding endogeneity, our price
measures are similar to the inverse of the dependent variable. Dierent from the dependent
variable, the price measures are not applied in form of South-North ratios, but in form of
sectoral recipient country prices. This mitigates the endogeneity risk. The endogeneity risk
would even be present if the real wages and energy prices were directly available, because
the wage is determined by labor productivity and the energy price is determined by energy
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productivity according to producer theory. This leads us to treat the estimation including
factor prices not as our preferable main estimation, but as a robustness check. We perform
this robustness check for the basic intermediate goods model (SME1 and SML1).18 We label
the constructed energy price PErm(t 3) and the constructed labor price (wage) PLrm(t 3).
The next robustness check addresses that our model leaves open what the origin of techni-
cal progress is. A common variable capturing this origin is R&D expenditures. Data on R&D
expenditures are unfortunately only fully available for OECD countries, in particular from
ANBERD. The focus of our work, however, is on productivity gains in emerging economies,
not in OECD countries. Besides this restriction, we need to reduce the sectoral coverage (cf.
section 3.2). Nonetheless, it can provide further insights to dierentiate the R&D capabil-
ity of the OECD source countries of technology spillovers. Hence, we treat the estimations
with R&D expenditures as a robustness check. We dene source-sector and source-country-
specic R&D expenditures per output value (R&D intensity) and label them IYul(t 3) (I for
innovation). We also let R&D intensity interact with the import and the high-skilled labor
intensity in order to check whether they generate a positive joint eect.
3.4 Estimation results
This section details the results of the (static) main regressions (energy and labor intensity,
investment and intermediate goods imports, hence four sets of regressions), the (static) sector-
and country-specic regressions (source-sector-specic, recipient-sector-specic and recipient-
country-specic) and the robustness checks (dynamic, with factor prices and with R&D
expenditures).
3.4.1 Main estimation results
This section reports and interprets the regression results for the static, general (not sector- or
region-specic) panel model. We always report heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in
the tables. Due to the large number of observations, the regressions are expected to generate
highly signicant results. We thus report the signicance levels 10%, 5%, 1%, 0.5%, and
0.1% ranging from one to ve stars. We also report adjusted R2 values. The coecients of
this dlog   log specication can be interpreted as follows:
A negative coecient implies that the relative factor intensity and thus the South-North
technology gap decline resulting in South-North convergence. A coecient of -0.05 for HL
means that doubling the high-skilled intensity (a 100% increase in HL) decreases the annual
18We do not apply the dynamic model because of the caveats sketched above.
21
Regressions SKE1...4
1 2 3 4
REYsrjkt REYsrjkt REYsrjkt REYsrjkt
HLr(t 3) -0.042** -0.048*** -0.031* -0.025*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
XYsrjk(t 3) -0.0041***** -0.0045***** -0.0017* -0.00094
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0014)
DYr(t 3) 0.0058**
(0.0028)
REYrjk(t 3) -0.16***** -0.17*****
(0.011) (0.013)
HLr(t 3) XYsrjk(t 3) 0.00017
REYrk(t 3) (0.00030)
Constant -0.17***** -0.17***** 0.20***** 0.23*****
(0.047) (0.049) (0.045) (0.035)
#Obs. 97,942 97,942 97,942 97,942
R2 0.004 0.004 0.037 0.037
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 4: Panel estimation of the drivers of the growth rate of the relative South-North energy
intensity including individual and time-specic eects (not reported in the table). Source
sectors include all sectors, recipient sectors only the investment (capital) good.
growth rate of the relative factor intensity (the South-North ratio of factor intensities) by
5 percentage points. The resulting half-time of the relative factor intensity solely driven by
HL is then about 14 years. A coecient of -0.005 for XY means that doubling the import
intensity (a 100% increase in XY ) decreases the annual growth rate of the the relative factor
intensity (the South-North ratio of factor intensities) by 0.5 percentage points. The resulting
half-time of the relative factor intensity solely driven by XY is now about 138 years.
Table 4 shows the results of estimating the drivers of the growth rate of the relative
South-North energy intensity including individual and time-specic eects (not reported in
the table). Source sectors include all sectors, recipient sectors only the economy-wide used
investment (capital) good. The coecient of the import intensity has in all cases the expected
negative sign, this means imports reduce the energy intensity of production in developing
countries. The coecient is in three of four cases signicant too.
Similarly, the coecient of the high-skilled intensity is always signicantly negative. How-
ever, the coecient is about an order of magnitude higher than the import coecient. The
22
Regressions SKL1...4
1 2 3 4
RLYsrjkt RLYsrjkt RLYsrjkt RLYsrjkt
HLr(t 3) -0.021***** -0.015**** -0.11***** -0.098*****
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0032) (0.0051)
XYsrjk(t 3) -0.0013***** -0.00085** 2.2e-06 0.0015****
(0.00036) (0.00037) (0.00026) (0.00051)
DYr(t 3) -0.0061*****
(0.0011)
RLYri(t 3) -0.17***** -0.19*****
(0.0030) (0.0059)
HLr(t 3) XYsrjk(t 3) 0.00027***
RLYri(t 3) (0.000077)
Constant -0.064***** -0.055***** 0.10***** 0.17*****
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.024)
#Obs. 98,173 98,173 98,155 98,155
R2 0.051 0.051 0.250 0.251
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 5: Panel estimation of the drivers of the growth rate of the relative South-North labor
intensity including individual and time-specic eects (not reported in the table). Source
sectors include all sectors, recipient sectors only the investment (capital) good.
coecient of domestically produced investment goods in column 2 of Table 4 has a similar
magnitude as imported investment goods { but it is signicantly positive. These results
indicate that education, or more generally speaking absorptive capacity, has a stronger pos-
itive impact on factor productivity growth than imports of investment goods. Domestically
produced investment goods, on the opposite, likely raise energy intensity, or in other words,
lower energy productivity. This indicates that in the non-OECD countries in our sample,
domestic investment goods shift production towards energy-intensive production and do not
bring about technical progress suciently to reduce energy intensity { in contrast to imported
investment goods.
Furthermore, the relative energy intensity with a three-year lag enters in a signicantly
negative way in column 3 as suggested by theory: the lower the initial productivity level and
thus the larger the technology gap, the higher becomes the growth rate and thus technological
catching up. We do not identify a signicant interaction bonus of absorptive capacity, imports
and the previous technology level in column 4 though. { More details will be discussed in
23
Regressions SME1...4
1 2 3 4
REYsrjmt REYsrjmt REYsrjmt REYsrjmt
HLr(t 3) -0.031***** -0.068***** -0.048***** -0.049*****
(0.0042) (0.0048) (0.0040) (0.0036)
XYsrjm(t 3) -0.0028***** -0.0050***** -0.0019***** -0.0020*****
(0.00025) (0.00027) (0.00023) (0.00026)
DYr(t 3) 0.027*****
(0.00085)
REYri(t 3) -0.15***** -0.15*****
(0.0015) (0.0022)
HLr(t 3) XYsrjm(t 3) -0.000036
REYri(t 3) (0.000058)
Constant -0.11***** -0.22***** 0.021* 0.017*
(0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.0093)
#Obs. 1,478,944 1,478,944 1,478,944 1,478,944
R2 0.004 0.005 0.054 0.054
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 6: Panel estimation of the drivers of the growth rate of the relative South-North energy
intensity including individual and time-specic eects (not reported in the table). Source
sectors include all sectors, recipient sectors only manufacturing sectors.
section 3.4.
Table 5 shows the regressions of Table 4 for labor intensity instead of energy intensity.
Now the import intensity of investment goods has only in the rst two regressions a signi-
cantly negative impact on the growth rate of relative labor intensity. Notably, in the rst two
columns the magnitude of the negative coecients is smaller than in the rst two columns
of Table 4. This indicates an energy bias of trade-related productivity gains. In the fourth
column, the trade impact has the opposite sign, i.e. imports of investment goods raise rela-
tive labor intensity. This means, in comparison with Table 4, the energy bias is even more
obvious.
The coecient of high-skilled labor intensity is again always negative, but its magnitude
is more diverse (in the rst two regressions lower, in the last two higher than in Table 4).
Domestic investment now enters with a signicantly negative sign.
The past relative labor intensity enters with a negative sign and a slightly higher magni-
tude than in the previous energy intensity regressions. The coecient of the interaction term
is signicantly positive and small. Thus, the expected joint benet of absorptive capacity,
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Regressions SML1...4
1 2 3 4
RLYsrjmt RLYsrjmt RLYsrjmt RLYsrjmt
HLr(t 3) -0.095***** -0.13***** -0.15***** -0.15*****
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0013)
XYsrjm(t 3) 0.00066***** -0.0013***** 0.00071***** 0.00082*****
(0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00014) (0.00018)
DYr(t 3) 0.024*****
(0.00049)
RLYri(t 3) -0.17***** -0.17*****
(0.00048) (0.0012)
HLr(t 3) XYsrjm(t 3) 0.000029
RLYri(t 3) (0.000025)
Constant -0.22***** -0.32***** -0.12***** -0.12*****
(0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0034) (0.0050)
#Obs. 1,483,623 1,483,623 1,483,371 1,483,371
R2 (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0034) (0.0050)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 7: Panel estimation of the drivers of the growth rate of the relative South-North labor
intensity including individual and time-specic eects (not reported in the table). Source
sectors include all sectors, recipient sectors only manufacturing sectors.
imports and the previous technology level is not conrmed.
Table 6 looks again at relative energy intensity { now with imports of intermediate goods
instead of investment goods. The results are similar to those in Table 4. Some coecients of
the import intensity are larger than in Table 4, some are lower. Thus, we do not detect a clear
dierence between imports used as intermediate goods or investment goods. The coecients
of the high-skilled intensity are in most cases larger and still signicantly negative. The
coecient of domestic investment is again positive and even much larger than in Table 4.
Table 7 looks again at relative labor intensity { now with imports of intermediate goods
instead of investment goods. The most striking dierence to the previous results is the signif-
icantly positive impact of import intensity in most regressions. This counteracts expectations
of strong labor productivity gains from imports resulting in South-North convergence of la-
bor intensities and per-capita income. This is a clear dierence to energy intensity where we
always nd negative coecients of imports. This clearly indicates that trade-related produc-
tivity spillovers are biased towards energy productivity. We also nd much larger negative
coecients of the high-skilled intensity than in the previous regressions.
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3.4.2 Specic estimation results
This section discusses the static sector- and country-specic regression results.
The results for dierent source sectors, or in other words dierent traded goods, are
reported in Tables 12 to 14 in the Appendix. Tables 12 and 13 refer to investment goods
imports, Tables 14 and 15 to intermediate goods imports. The results follow intuition:
machinery, electrical equipment and transport equipment reduce the relative energy intensity
when they are used as investment goods, but not metal products. The former likely include
new, energy-ecient devices while metal products do not, and the latter are not a typical
investment good. Herein, electrical equipment deploys the strongest eect. This shows
that high-tech products have an especially high potential for creating productivity gains.
Electrical equipment also has the strongest eect on relative energy intensity when it is used
as an intermediate input. When used as intermediate goods, metal products reduce energy
intensity as well. Similarly, machinery, electrical equipment and transport equipment reduce
the relative labor intensity, but not metal products. Now machinery has the strongest impact.
This appears intuitive because machinery can be directly used by workers.
The results for dierent recipient sectors are reported in Tables 16 and 17 in the Appendix.
With respect to individual recipient sectors, we nd heterogeneity too. The high-skilled labor
share reduces relative factor intensities as in our other regressions except in the regression
for energy intensity and intermediate goods imports in the chemical sector. Similarly, high-
skilled labor has the weakest impact in the chemical sector when looking at relative labor
intensity. This indicates that skills do not play a crucial role for factor productivity in the
chemical sector. The coecients of import intensity are all negative with the exception of
intermediate imports in the chemical sector though. The strongest reduction of relative
energy as well as labor intensity via imports shows up in the machinery sector. This appears
intuitive since fabricated intermediate inputs like metal products play an important role in
this sector. As one could expect, the coecient of imports with respect to labor intensity
is higher in the labor-intensive textile sector than in the energy-intensive pulp and paper
sector. Regarding the impact on relative energy intensity, the coecient of import intensity
is higher in the energy-intensive chemical sector than in the textile sector, but the coecient
is lower in the energy-intensive pulp and paper sector. Thus, the results do not clearly reveal
a higher potential for energy savings via intermediate imports in energy-intensive sectors.
The results for dierent recipient countries are reported in Tables 18 to 21 in the Ap-
pendix. Tables 18 and 19 report the results for investment goods imports, Tables 20 and 21
for intermediate goods imports. Regarding the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and
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China), we nd that imports used as investment goods or as intermediate inputs reduce the
relative energy intensity, and in most cases with a higher magnitude than in the general static
regressions. Imports used as intermediate inputs also reduce Russia's labor intensity. We
do not nd a signicant impact of imports on Chinese energy intensity though. The picture
changes when looking at relative labor intensity: now China can clearly benet, but only
through imported intermediate goods, not through investment goods. This appears intuitive
since China's comparative advantage is cheap, abundant labor employed in fabricating goods
from imported intermediate goods. We also nd this eect for Brazil and India, but with a
smaller magnitude. We do not nd this eect for Russia which does not have its compara-
tive advantage in fabricating goods from imported intermediate goods but in exporting fossil
energy. Regarding the impact of imported investment goods on relative labor intensity we
only nd a weakly signicant and small eect for India.
3.4.3 Robustness check results
This section discusses the results of the robustness checks: the inclusion of constructed factor
prices and of R&D expenditures and the dynamic model estimations.
First, we discuss the dynamic model estimation with a lagged dependent variable. The
results for both, energy and labor intensity (DKE3/4 and DKL3/4), are reported in Table
11 in the Appendix. In the dynamic regressions given by Equation (2) without xed eects,
the standard errors are robust against heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. We also apply
Windmeijers (2005) nite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. We limit the
instrument count by using only two time lags of regressors as instruments, and we collapse
the instrument set to avoid proliferation of instruments. Note that the coecients are not
directly comparable to those of the dlog   log specication in the static model regarding
their magnitude. We now look at very short-term eects using one-period lags whereas we
use three-period lags in the static regressions. The coecients of the dynamic log   log
specication can be interpreted as in the following example:
In 2009 the South-North ratio of energy intensities was 3.1, and the ratio of labor in-
tensities was 15.1 according to WIOD. Table 11, column 3 reports a coecient of -0.018 for
HL with respect to the relative labor intensity. This means that doubling the high-skilled
intensity (a 100% increase in HL) decreases the relative labor intensity itself by 1.8 percent-
age points per year. The resulting time to reduce the relative factor intensity to 7.55 is then
about 11 years. A coecient of 0.03 for XY with respect to the labor intensity means that
doubling the import intensity (a 100% increase in XY ) increases the relative labor intensity
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by 3 percentage points per year. The resulting time to reduce the relative factor intensity to
7.55 would then be about 66 years.
The rst striking aspect of the results reported in Table 11 is the positive sign of the
coecients of import intensity in the labor intensity regressions, while the coecients of
imports are insignicant in the energy intensity regressions. This means, imports reduce labor
productivity and enhance South-North divergence. This supports our previous nding that
trade-related North-South productivity spillovers are biased towards energy productivity.
Regarding the magnitude of the coecients, the dynamic estimations are in line with the
static ones. Additionally, the interaction term in regression (4) is positive. This means that
the interplay of skills (absorptive capacity), imports and backwardness reduces relative labor
productivity.
The second striking aspect is the insignicance of the high-skilled intensity in the energy
intensity regressions. This depicts that skills directly aect labor, not necessarily energy.
The main advantage of the dynamic specication is to have a direct measure of conver-
gence. A coecient of 0.94 to 0.99 as found in the four dynamic regressions implies a 1%
to 6% reduction in the relative factor intensity per year. This is in line with the WIOD
data that show an average growth rate of non-OECD of -5% for labor intensity and -3% for
energy intensity. Notably, these results corroborate the assumption of 0 = 1 that we made
when deriving the static model in section 3.3.1. More details regarding the magnitude of the
eects will be discussed in section 3.5.
The dynamic estimations allow us to distinguish short- and long-run eects. 0 is the
coecient of the lagged relative factor intensity, and 2 is the coecient of the import
intensity in Equation (2). Then 2 describes the short-run impact of the import intensity on
the relative factor intensity, and 21 0 describes the long-run impact. The long-run impact
takes into account that a higher import intensity not only inuences the relative factor
intensity in the next period, but also in all proceeding periods via the lagged factor intensity
term. Since the dynamic regression results reported in Table 11 yield signicant coecients
in the labor intensity regressions, but not in the energy intensity regressions, we compute
the long-run eect only for labor intensity. The long-run eects of investment good import
intensity on relative labor intensity are accordingly 0.6 (in DKL3) and 0.5 (in DKL4 including
the threefold interaction term), whereas the respective short-run eects reported in the table
are 0.012 and 0.030. This result highlights that although the reported short-run eects
appear small, long-run eects are much higher and exhibit a considerable magnitude.
Nevertheless, we rely more on the static regressions since the dynamic regressions are
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subject to overidentication and autocorrelation problems as discussed in section 3.6.
The results of the robustness checks including factor prices and R&D expenditures are
depicted in Tables 22 and 23 in the Appendix.
Second, Table 22 in the Appendix depicts the results of the regressions including con-
structed factor prices for recipient countries. Accordingly, the energy price has a negative
sign and thus contributes to South-North convergence, whereas the labor price has a positive
sign and contributes to divergence. The negative sign directly follows economic intuition: a
higher energy price reduces (relative) energy intensity. The positive sign indicates that sec-
tors with higher or increasing wages nonetheless operate with higher labor intensities. The
remaining coecients partly dier from the main regression results. The coecient of the
import intensity in the energy-specic regression is similar to that in column three of Table
6. Surprisingly, the sign of the high-skilled intensity has switched to a positive value. In
the labor-specic regression, the sign of the high-skilled intensity is still negative, but the
magnitude is smaller than in the main regressions listed in Table 7. In the labor-specic
regression, the coecient of the import intensity is positive and larger than in Table 7. This
implies an even more pronounced trade-related energy bias than in the main regressions.
Third, Table 23 in the Appendix reports the robustness check results including lagged
R&D expenditures per output value of source countries IYul(t 3) (R&D intensity). The
index u indicates the reduced source country sample, the index l the reduced source sector
sample compared with the previous regressions. The positive coecients of IYul(t 3), not
signicant for energy intensity though, are counterintuitive at rst glance: a higher R&D
intensity accordingly leads to higher positive growth of the relative factor intensity and thus
divergence. At second glance, our results t to theory: in the classical Nelson and Phelps
(1966) theory, a higher rate of technical progress of the leading technology augments the gap
between the technology in practice and the leading technology. Under the assumption that
a higher R&D intensity of the North fosters its rate of technical progress, the South-North
technology gap will become larger so that we will observe divergence as depicted by our
results.
Table 23 also reports the threefold interaction of the R&D intensity of source countries
with the high-skilled labor intensity of recipient countries and the investment good trade ow
between them.19 In both cases, with relative energy and labor intensity as the dependent
variable, the threefold interaction term has the expected negative sign. This means that
the joint incidence of conducive source and recipient country characteristics enhances South-
19We also check the twofold interaction of the R&D intensity with the investment good trade ow, yet
without nding a signicant impact.
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North convergence of factor intensities (additionally to the divergence eect discussed above).
Notably, the coecient of the threefold interaction term is the same for relative energy and
labor intensity as the dependent variable and has a relatively small magnitude of -0.00015.
The remaining coecients are not much aected by the inclusion of R&D expenditures.
Notably, the changes in the coecients compared with the previous main estimations are
mainly caused by the reduction of the sample size.20 This means, there is almost no omitted
variable bias when leaving out R&D expenditures. The coecient of investment goods
import intensity XYurlk(t 3) with respect to relative energy intensity growth REYurlkt
reported in the rst column of Table 23 has the same value as in the third column of the
main regression in Table 4, i.e. -0.0017. This value is, however, clearly lower than in the rst
and second column of Table 4. The coecients of the high-skilled labor intensity HLr(t 3)
are in Table 23 only slightly higher than the corresponding values in Tables 4 and 5. The
coecient of investment goods import intensity XYurlk(t 3) with respect to relative labor
intensity growth RLYurlkt is in the third column of Table 23 slightly larger than in the
main regression in Table 5 and negative, i.e. -0.0018. Hence, the trade-related energy bias
is not visible here.
3.5 Summary and prediction
In summary, we can formulate the following results:
First, we nd that Southern (non-OECD) energy and labor intensities converge to North-
ern (OECD) ones. This is shown by the static regressions S..4 including the lagged relative
factor intensity: the coecients of the lagged relative factor intensity are all highly signi-
cant and negative. It is conrmed by the dynamic regressions: the coecients of the lagged
dependent variable are always positive and in most cases signicant { and they are smaller
than one so that the relative factor intensity (the South-North ratio of factor intensities)
shrinks over time.
Second, international trade in form of imports of investment and intermediate goods in
general supports convergence: the coecient of imports is in most cases signicant and often
negative. However, the eect of imports is an order of magnitude smaller than the eect
of education or absorptive capacity in form of the high-skilled labor intensity in Southern
countries. Theory (going back to Nelson and Phelps, 1966, and Findlay, 1978) suggests that
trade and foreign investment positively interact with education and with technological back-
20We show this by running the reduced sample R&D regression without R&D expenditures as a regressor
for comparison.
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wardness. Thus, we include the interaction of import intensity, high-skilled labor intensity
and lagged relative factor intensity in the regressions. Its estimated coecient is often not
signicant though. If it is signicant, its sign is often opposite of what we expect, i.e. it is
positive and enhances divergence, and it has a small magnitude.
Besides looking at the threefold interaction of the import intensity with the high-skilled
labor intensity and with the lagged relative factor intensity as suggested by theory, we also
look at the twofold interaction of the import intensity with the high-skilled labor intensity
(not reported in the tables). In the static regressions for energy or labor intensity and for
investment or intermediate goods imports (SKE4, SKL4, SME4 and SML4) the estimated
coecient of the twofold interaction in log-form is in most cases -0.0017 and -0.0060 and is
always highly signicant. This suggests a notable additional eect of imports in the presence
of high skills. The twofold interaction specication is, however, subject to a caveat: it is
highly correlated with both, the high-skilled labor intensity and the import intensity, which
appears to bias the results. For this reason and for consistency with theory, we rely more on
the threefold interaction specication as reported in the tables.
Third, and importantly, we nd a clear dierence between Southern investment goods
stemming from the North and stemming from the same Southern country: domestic in-
vestment goods always have a stronger eect on the relative factor intensity than foreign
investment goods. In three of four cases (Tables 4 to 7), the sign is positive. This means, in
contrast to foreign investment goods, domestic investment goods tend to enlarge the relative
factor intensity and thus contribute to divergence of factor productivity. This conrms the
presumption that international trade (and international investment) are associated with pro-
ductivity gains via technology spillovers and competition and rm selection. This appears
especially intuitive when considering that only foreign products embody advanced technolo-
gies that are not yet available in the South.
Fourth, having a closer look at the dierence between energy and labor intensities in the
general static regressions, it turns out that imports always reduce relative energy intensity.
On the contrary, imports reduce relative labor intensity in most cases to a much smaller
extent. In some cases they even raise relative labor intensity, indicated by positive coecients
(in Tables 5 and 7). This implies South-North divergence. This result is backed up by our
source-sector-specic regressions, in which investment goods imports reduce energy intensity
to a larger extent than labor intensity. This indicates that international technology diusion
is not equal for all factors (total factor productivity) but directed or biased { in this case
towards energy productivity rather than labor productivity (in the sense of Acemoglu, 2002).
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This result is surprising when recalling that our descriptive statistics reveal stronger South-
North convergence of labor- than of energy-intensity. Nevertheless, the impact of trade on
convergence appears to be stronger regarding energy intensity as explained above. Hence,
trade policy can be a measure to enhance 'green growth'.
The dierence between imports used as intermediate inputs or investment goods is not
that clear-cut though: in some cases, the coecient of the import intensity is higher for
investment goods, in other cases it is higher for intermediate goods (in Table 4 to 7).
Fifth, the results become more diverse when looking at specic source and recipient sectors
or recipient countries (Tables 12 to 21 in the Appendix). { For a summary, the reader may
refer to the concluding section 4. { It is relevant for the policy implementation to take this
heterogeneity into account so that policy measures can be targeted at sectors and countries
where they have a high potential.
Sixth, a higher R&D intensity and a consequently stronger technological momentum of
an industrialized country appear to impede technological catching up by emerging countries
and thus enhance divergence. This nding is in accordance with the classical Nelson and
Phelps (1966) theory. Nonetheless, the joint incidence of conducive characteristics of source
(R&D intensity) and recipient countries (high-skilled labor intensity) enhances South-North
convergence of factor intensities.
Seventh, with regard to the magnitude and relevance of the estimated eects, we can
formulate the following approximate results:
In the static regressions, the magnitude of the coecients of the lagged relative factor in-
tensity is pronounced and robust in the range of -0.15 to -0.19, averaging around -0.17. Thus,
there is convergence in both, energy and labor intensities. Being 100% further backward,
i.e. having twice a relative factor intensity, reduces the growth rate of the relative factor
intensity by around 17% per year. This implies that this driver declines during the catching
up process so that growth rates decline. This is a typical convergence mechanism. We nd in
the static model that this eect is somewhat higher for labor than for energy intensities. In
the dynamic model, we nd coecients of 0.97 and 0.99 for lagged relative energy intensity,
and 0.98 and 0.94 for lagged labor intensity. This implies relative changes of the relative
factor intensity of -1 to -6% per year and a resulting half-time of factor intensity of 101 to
33 years.
How important are the results economically regarding their magnitude? Turning back
to the drivers of convergence, our general (not specically for machinery or BRIC-countries)
regressions yield coecients of the high-skilled labor intensity of around -0.05. This means
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Extrapolated future time paths based on the regression results for the aggregate
regions OECD and non-OECD. (a) Energy intensity (energy input to GDP) EtYt ; (b) Labor
intensity (labor input to GDP) LtYt . BAU assumes that the historical averages of factor
intensity growth prevail in every year in the future. 1.25HL assumes a 25% increase in
the high-skilled intensity in non-OECD; 1.5XY low assumes a 50% increase in the import
intensity in non-OECD and a low coecient governing the impact of the import intensity;
1.5XY high assumes the same increase with a high coecient.
that doubling the high-skilled intensity (a 100% increase) decreases the annual growth rate of
the the relative factor intensity (the South-North ratio of factor intensities) by 5 percentage
points. The resulting half-time of the relative factor intensity solely driven by high-skilled
labor will then be about 14 years. This is a strong eect. However, such a change in the
high-skilled intensity is challenging and would need much time. The graphs plotted in Figure
2 for (a) energy and (b) labor intensities thus assume only a 25% increase in the high-skilled
ratio in scenario 'non-OECD 1.25HL'. The business as usual (BAU) scenario assumes that
energy and labor intensity fall at a constant annual rate which equals the average growth
rate within the time frame 1995 to 2009 as given by the descriptive statistics.21 Accordingly,
full South-North convergence would already be achieved in the 2080s for energy intensity and
in the 2070s for labor intensity. Thereby, we keep the exogenous business as usual growth
rate constant. However, on would expect that the growth rate declines during the catching
up process, which we leave aside for simplicity and clarity of the graphical presentation.
Our general regressions yield coecients of around -0.005 for import intensity (investment
as well as intermediate good). This means that doubling the import intensity (a 100%
increase) decreases the annual growth rate of the the relative factor intensity by 0.5 percentage
points. The resulting half-time of the relative factor intensity solely driven by imports is now
about 138 years. Since the coecients vary across the regressions between about half and
double the average coecient of -0.005, we assume two scenarios: 'non-OECD 1.5XY low'
21The average annual growth rate of energy intensity in OECD between 1995 and 2009 is -2%, in non-OECD
it is -3%. The average annual growth rate of labor intensity in OECD is also -2%, in non-OECD it is -5%.
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with a 50% increase in the import intensity and half the average coecient, and 'non-OECD
1.5XY high' with a 50% increase in the import intensity and twice the average coecient.
Herein, a 50% change in the import intensity appears realistic according to the descriptive
statistics (Figure 1d). It turns out that the impact is rather small in the 'low' scenario and
moderate in the 'high' scenario. In 'high', the productivity gap can be halved by 2100. This
result applies to energy intensities (Figure 2a) as well as labor intensities (Figure 2b).
3.6 Discussion and caveats
Our analysis is due to some caveats. Taking these aspects into account, our main results are
rather robust across dierent model specications. Particularly, the energy bias of interna-
tional technology diusion holds for multi-country as well as single-country and single-sector
specications. Due to the large number of observations, many coecients are signicant at
the 0.1% or 0.5% level.
First, the high-skilled labor intensity HL represents education and more generally speak-
ing the absorptive capacity (infrastructure, legal system, security, media access etc.) of a
non-OECD country. However, we cannot clearly identify what it captures and what the
country-specic xed eects capture. Particularly, the WIOD data do not include R&D
expenditures so that R&D is only implicitly captured in the xed eects of our main and
specic regressions. There is to our knowledge no global data set on R&D expenditures
including most developing countries. This applies especially to R&D expenditures on energy
productivity. Notwithstanding, we include R&D expenditures available for OECD countries
from ANBERD in a robustness check with a small impact on the main results.
Second, technology diusion processes require time. It is therefore dicult to decide upon
the appropriate time lag between the impact, such as importing, and the result, measurable
technical progress. We assume a three-year lag, taking into account that on the one hand
technology diusion requires time, on the other hand our sample encompasses only 15 years
so that long-term eects can hardly be measured. We also try other time lags. We nd
that the coecients will become lower when the time lag is smaller. This supports our
expectation that technology diusion processes require time so that the measurable impact
increases over time. We also nd in some cases with smaller time lags a positive impact of
imported intermediate goods on the growth rate of relative energy intensity. This indicates
that in the short-run scale or rebound eects dominate, while the technology eect has not yet
been exploited. This means that intermediate imports can enhance divergence in the short-
run. Notwithstanding, this eect is stronger for relative labor intensity than for relative
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energy intensity. In this sense, imports of intermediates result in stronger divergence of labor
intensities than of energy intensities in the short-run. This in turn means that the energy bias
of trade-induced technology spillovers is conrmed. Thus, in general, our key conclusions are
qualitatively robust. In the dynamic specication, we nevertheless stay with the standard
one-period lag specication. Despite the one-period lag specication, each impact propagates
to future periods through the lagged dependent variable. Besides using three-year time lags,
we also smooth the data with three-period moving averages. The smoothing has, however, a
small impact on the results.
Third, we apply general method of moments (GMM) estimations (Arellano-Bond) to
address Nickel bias and other reasons for endogeneity as discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3.3.
While the static regressions yield rather robust results, the dynamic regressions often run
into overidentication and autocorrelation problems (indicated by the Arellano-Bond test
for autocorrelation and the Sargan/Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions) and do
not produce robust results. The reason could be that we have a very large cross-section but
a short time series. Hence, for each variable and time lag, the instrument count becomes
very high. This applies particularly to the larger sample with intermediate inputs. Hence, we
focus on the static regressions. Nonetheless, the dynamic regressions back up the results of
the static regressions, provide further insights into the dynamics, long-term and short-term
eects and take endogeneity issues into account.
Fourth, a number of potential explanatory variables cannot be included since no data are
available, for example energy and labor taxes and energy subsidies. Foreign direct investment
(FDI) is another channel for technology spillovers. FDI data are not available for the countries
and sectors in the sample though. Nonetheless, we construct approximate wage and energy
price variables for recipient countries from WIOD that we include in a robustness check. As a
result, the trade-related energy bias is very pronounced. We also include R&D expenditures
for source countries in a reduced sample. The trade-related energy-bias is not visible here.
Overall, the results are relatively robust to these modications.
4 Conclusion
We scrutinize South-North convergence of energy and labor intensity driven by international
trade. We are to our knowledge the rst who apply the novel global WIOD (World Input-
Output Data) to a regression analysis. WIOD combines two (source and recipient) large
country dimensions with two large sector dimensions and a time dimension, and it consistently
includes all required variables. The sectoral resolution disentangles the technique eect from
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the sectoral decomposition eect, and dierent from other studies WIOD provides a global
multi-economy view at the same time. The use of all variables in intensity form eliminates
the scale eect.
We show that embodied North-South technology spillovers are biased (directed) towards
energy intensity rather than labor intensity. Additionally, we show that there is no robust
dierence between imports used as an investment good and imports used as an intermediate
input in this respect visible in the results. We also show that in contrast to imported
investment or intermediate goods, domestically produced investment goods do in most cases
not reduce but raise non-OECD factor intensities. This indicates that foreign goods embody
knowledge that domestic investment goods do not embody, or that trade is associated with
productivity gains from increased competition and rm selection.
Our results suggest that trade policy measures (reductions of taris and of trade barriers
or import and export subsidies) will achieve stronger improvements in energy than in labor
intensity. One may call this 'green growth'. This result holds for the multi-country, multi-
sector analysis as well as for the single-country and the single-sector analysis. However, our
regressions and future extrapolations indicate that the trade channel contributes only to a
small extent to South-North convergence of both, energy and labor intensity. Referring to our
dynamic model estimations, trade-induced short-run eects appear small, whereas a longer
time horizon can result in a considerable impact. The time horizon of halving the South-
North ratio in factor intensities solely through the import channel can exceed 100 years by
far. The climate change challenge as well as the poverty challenge require immediate action
though. As a consequence, the decarbonization of energy supply (not studied in this paper)
appears as the more important policy eld for reducing CO2 emissions in the mid-term.
Similarly, more direct measures targeting at poverty reduction and equality appear more
promising in the mid-term. In this respect, our results conrm the important role of skills
for enhancing productivity { in this case without a clear factor bias.
Nonetheless, trade policy measures can become more eective when policy targets certain
recipient countries or source and recipient sectors. We show that imported electrical equip-
ment { presumably due to its high-tech content { has an especially strong potential to reduce
relative energy intensity. Thus, 'green funding' policies that aim at the reduction of energy
use may focus on electrical or more generally speaking high-tech equipment. If a policy aims
at improving labor productivity, our analysis suggests focusing on machinery. Regarding re-
cipient sectors, our estimations show a high potential for reducing energy intensity as well as
labor intensity in the production of machinery via increased imports of intermediate goods.
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Our analysis of recipient countries shows that the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China)
countries can realize above-average gains from spillovers. China gains less in terms of energy
productivity, but more in terms of labor productivity via imports of intermediate goods.
Thus, relying on embodied international technology spillovers as a means to reduce Chinese
energy consumption and hence carbon emissions appears not sucient. On the opposite,
Brazil gains more than the other BRIC countries and the non-OECD average from imports
in terms of energy productivity. Thus, policies that support international trade and interna-
tional investment could particularly create energy productivity gains in Brazil.
Our results are not only relevant for policy makers but also for modelers. The latter
need to make assumptions on the strength of technical progress. In climate and energy
models, the distinction between general or labor-related and energy-related technical progress
is essential. Our analysis provides applicable results for this. Future research could look at
CO2 emissions and specic pollutants instead of energy and test for spillovers in energy
generation technologies.
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7 Supplementary Appendix
Variable Unit #Obs. Mean Med. Min. Max. Var.
Xsrjkt
Yrit
- 128325 6.10e-06 8.77e-09 0.000 0.005 5.36e-09
Xsrjmt
Yrit
- 1913052 4.21e-05 1.94e-07 0.000 0.252 5.38e-07
Est
Yst
MJ
US$ 465 8.968 6.382 1.631 50.430 67.057
Ert
Yrt
MJ
US$ 135 21.051 15.956 4.873 67.457 231.987
Ermt
Yrmt
MJ
US$ 1890 31.275 6.092 0.188 748.910 6529.555
Lst
Yst
h
US$ 465 0.038 0.020 0.005 0.197 0.001
Lrt
Yrt
h
US$ 135 0.267 0.188 0.022 1.214 0.068
Lrmt
Yrmt
h
US$ 1890 0.154 0.095 0.000 2.692 0.047
Hst
Lst
- 465 0.224 0.224 0.064 0.483 0.007
Hrt
Lrt
- 135 0.107 0.098 0.0230 0.350 0.004
Hrmt
Lrmt
- 1890 0.079 0.050 0.004 0.394 0.005
#Obs. = number of observations, Mean = arithmetic mean, Med. = median,
Min. = minimum value, Max. = maximum value, Var. = variance.
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of the WIOD data used in the regressions (X = trade, E =
energy, L = labor, H = high-skilled, all in intensity form; s = OECD source countries, r =
non-OECD recipient countries, m = manufacturing sectors, k = investment good).
REY REY RLY RLY HL XY DY
REY 1.0000
REY 0.0753 1.0000
RLY 0.1755 -0.0401 1.0000
RLY 0.0122 0.0906 -0.0057 1.0000
HL 0.0130 -0.0938 0.0155 -0.4718 1.0000
XY 0.0050 0.1625 0.0260 0.2428 0.0198 1.0000
DY 0.0687 -0.2196 -0.0170 0.0805 -0.0996 0.0215 1.0000
Table 9: Correlation matrix for the sample with the investment good k as the only recipient
sector (smaller sample).
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REY REY RLY RLY HL XY DY
REY 1.0000
REY 0.0436 1.0000
RLY 0.3060 -0.0409 1.0000
RLY -0.0094 -0.0504 0.0879 1.0000
HL 0.0405 -0.0773 0.0499 -0.2748 1.0000
XY -0.0054 -0.0369 0.0160 0.2691 0.0553 1.0000
DY 0.0780 -0.1572 0.0489 -0.0674 -0.0186 0.0434 1.0000
Table 10: Correlation matrix for the sample with manufacturing sectors m as recipient
sectors (larger sample).
Regressions DKE3/4 & DKL3/4
3 4 3 4
REYsrjkt REYsrjkt RLYsrjkt RLYsrjkt
REYrjk(t 1) 0.97***** 0.99*****
(0.073) (0.16)
RLYrjk(t 1) 0.98***** 0.94*****
(0.0058) (0.014)
HLr(t 1) -0.0062 -0.0037 -0.018** 0.040*****
(0.028) (0.082) (0.0072) (0.0096)
XYsrjk(t 1) 0.0060 -0.0022 0.012** 0.030*****
(0.061) (0.058) (0.0063) (0.0068)
HLr(t 1) XYsrjk(t 1) 0.0043
REYrk(t 1) (0.0031)
HLr(t 1) XYsrjk(t 1) 0.0013*****
RLYrk(t 1) (0.00029)
Constant 0.15 -0.028 0.22* 0.65*****
(1.12) (1.20) (0.11) (0.14)
#Obs. 114,353 114,353 114,620 114,620
AR(1) test (z) -2.77 -2.91 1.43 2.74
p-value 0.006 0.004 0.153 0.006
AR(2) test (z) 2.01 2.10 -1.60 -0.77
p-value 0.045 0.035 0.11 0.44
Hansen J test (2) 10.9 11.0 36.4 19.1
p-value 0.0043 0.0040 2.4e-07 0.00076
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 11: Robustness check: dynamic panel estimation of the drivers of the change in the
relative South-North energy and labor intensity excluding individual and time-specic eects.
Source sectors include all sectors, recipient sectors only the investment (capital) good.
42
Regression SKE2
Metals Machinery Elec. equip. Trans. equip.
REYsr(j1)kt REYsr(j2)kt REYsr(j3)kt REYsr(j4)kt
HLr(t 3) -0.054*** -0.058**** -0.055* -0.059**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.031) (0.027)
XYsrjk(t 3) -0.0022 -0.0053*** -0.0086** -0.0058**
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0039) (0.0024)
DYr(t 3) 0.0047 0.0078 0.011 0.0076
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0094) (0.0078)
Constant -0.14*** -0.15**** -0.17** -0.15**
(0.052) (0.052) (0.085) (0.074)
#Obs. 3,337 3,342 3,270 3,277
R2 0.078 0.119 0.230 0.106
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 12: Source-sector-specic estimation: panel estimation of the drivers of the growth rate
of the relative South-North energy intensity including individual and time-specic eects (not
reported in the table). Source sectors include only one of the following sectors (j1:::4): Basic
Metals and Fabricated Metal; Machinery, Nec; Electrical and Optical Equipment; Transport
Equipment. Recipient sectors include only the investment (capital) good.
Regression SKL2
Metals Machinery Elec. equip. Trans. equip.
RLYsr(j1)kt RLYsr(j2)kt RLYsr(j3)kt RLYsr(j4)kt
HLr(t 3) -0.026 -0.033 -0.023 -0.037*
(0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
XYsrjk(t 3) 0.00059 -0.010***** -0.0063** -0.0047***
(0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0017)
DYr(t 3) -0.0051 0.0051 0.00063 -0.0024
(0.0038) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0047)
Constant -0.11** -0.21**** -0.14** -0.18****
(0.045) (0.060) (0.059) (0.054)
#Obs. 3,337 3,342 3,270 3,277
R2 (0.045) (0.060) (0.059) (0.054)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 13: Source-sector-specic estimation: same as previous table, but growth rate of the
relative South-North labor intensity as dependent variable.
43
Regression SME2
Metals Machinery Elec. equip. Trans. equip.
REYsr(j1)mt REYsr(j2)mt REYsr(j3)mt REYsr(j4)mt
HLr(t 3) -0.069***** -0.065***** -0.067***** -0.065*****
(0.0098) (0.0097) (0.012) (0.011)
XYsrjm(t 3) -0.0026**** -0.0079***** -0.012***** -0.0026**
(0.00093) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.00100)
DYr(t 3) 0.024***** 0.028***** 0.031***** 0.024*****
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0032)
Constant -0.16***** -0.17***** -0.23***** -0.098****
(0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.029)
#Obs. 46,714 46,772 45,754 45,316
R2 0.026 0.057 0.126 0.051
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 14: Source-sector-specic estimation: panel estimation of the drivers of the growth rate
of the relative South-North energy intensity including individual and time-specic eects (not
reported in the table). Source sectors include only one of the following sectors (j1:::4): Basic
Metals and Fabricated Metal; Machinery, Nec; Electrical and Optical Equipment; Transport
Equipment. Recipient sectors include manufacturing sectors, i.e. we look at imports used as
intermediate inputs.
Regression SML2
Metals Machinery Elec. equip. Trans. equip.
RLYsr(j1)mt RLYsr(j2)mt RLYsr(j3)mt RLYsr(j4)mt
HLr(t 3) -0.13***** -0.13***** -0.13***** -0.13*****
(0.0089) (0.0099) (0.0098) (0.0097)
XYsrjm(t 3) -0.0011 -0.012***** -0.0066***** -0.0027****
(0.00082) (0.0010) (0.00091) (0.00088)
DYr(t 3) 0.025***** 0.033***** 0.029***** 0.024*****
(0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0026)
Constant -0.31***** -0.44***** -0.35***** -0.33*****
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
#Obs. 46,714 46,772 45,754 45,316
R2 0.047 0.097 0.135 0.058
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 15: Source-sector-specic estimation: same as previous table, but growth rate of the
relative South-North labor intensity as dependent variable.
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Regression SME2
Textiles Pulp & Paper Chemicals Machinery
REYsrj(m1)t REYsrj(m2)t REYsrj(m3)t REYsrj(m4)t
HLr(t 3) -0.073***** -0.12***** -0.010 -0.38*****
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
XYsrjk(t 3) -0.0042***** -0.0030**** -0.0049***** -0.0092*****
(0.00096) (0.00094) (0.00089) (0.0011)
DYr(t 3) 0.036***** 0.036***** -0.0089**** 0.078*****
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0031)
Constant -0.15**** -0.30***** -0.14**** -0.99*****
(0.045) (0.049) (0.044) (0.052)
#Obs. 105,885 105,784 106,170 105,318
R2 0.010 0.021 0.010 0.086
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 16: Recipient-sector-specic estimation: panel estimation of the drivers of the growth
rate of the relative South-North energy intensity including individual and time-specic eects
(not reported in the table). Source sectors encompass all sectors. Recipient sectors include
only one of the following manufacturing sectors (m1:::4): Textiles and Textile Products; Pulp,
Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing; Chemicals and Chemical Products; Machinery, Nec;
i.e. we look at imports used as intermediate inputs.
Regression SML2
Textiles Pulp & paper Chemicals Machinery
RLYsrj(m1)t RLYsrj(m2)t RLYsrj(m3)t RLYsrj(m4)t
HLr(t 3) -0.19***** -0.20***** -0.076***** -0.15*****
(0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0060) (0.0064)
XYsrjk(t 3) -0.0025***** -0.0018**** 0.00055 -0.0042*****
(0.00058) (0.00063) (0.00065) (0.00069)
DYr(t 3) 0.048***** 0.048***** 0.035***** 0.042*****
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0015)
Constant -0.43***** -0.50***** -0.16***** -0.41*****
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
#Obs. 106,231 106,124 106,508 105,633
R2 0.087 0.093 0.049 0.223
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 17: Recipient-sector-specic: same as previous table, but growth rate of the relative
South-North labor intensity as dependent variable.
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Regression SKE1
Brazil Russia India China
REYs(r1)jkt REYs(r2)jkt REYs(r3)jkt REYs(r4)jkt
XYsrjk(t 3) -0.0068**** 0.0016 -0.0055**** -0.0023
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0016)
Constant -0.097** 0.0079 -0.100**** -0.049*
(0.044) (0.034) (0.035) (0.027)
#Obs. 10,594 11,568 10,913 11,252
R2 0.006 0.009 0.051 0.003
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 18: Recipient-country-specic: panel estimation of the drivers of the growth rate of
the relative South-North energy intensity including individual and time-specic eects (not
reported in the table). Source countries include all OECD countries, but we use only one of
the BRIC countries (r1:::4) as a recipient country of trade in investment goods at a time.
Source sectors include all sectors, recipient sectors include only the investment (capital) good.
Regression SKL1
Brazil Russia India China
RLYs(r1)jkt RLYs(r2)jkt RLYs(r3)jkt RLYs(r4)jkt
XYsrjk(t 3) -0.0016 0.00058 -0.0021* -0.0016
(0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0010)
Constant 0.014 -0.039 -0.095***** -0.066*****
(0.024) (0.029) (0.021) (0.018)
#Obs. 10,620 11,599 10,946 11,281
R2 0.107 0.037 0.195 0.230
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 19: Recipient-country-specic: same as previous table, but growth rate of the relative
South-North labor intensity as dependent variable.
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Regression SME1
Brazil Russia India China
REYs(r1)jmt REYs(r2)jmt REYs(r3)jmt REYs(r4)jmt
XYsrjm(t 3) -0.0087***** -0.0027**** -0.0028***** -0.00025
(0.00059) (0.00094) (0.00055) (0.00051)
Constant -0.097***** 0.046*** -0.0074 -0.026***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.0090) (0.0091)
#Obs. 159,087 172,232 160,069 168,405
R2 0.008 0.026 0.054 0.016
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 20: Recipient-country-specic: panel estimation of the drivers of the growth rate of
the relative South-North energy intensity including individual and time-specic eects (not
reported in the table). Source countries include all OECD countries, but we use only one of
the BRIC countries (r1:::4) as a recipient country of trade in intermediate goods at a time.
Source sectors include all sectors, recipient sectors include manufacturing sectors, i.e. we
look at imports used as intermediate inputs.
Regression SML1
Brazil Russia India China
RLYs(r1)jmt RLYs(r2)jmt RLYs(r3)jmt RLYs(r4)jmt
XYsrjm(t 3) -0.0014** -0.00099 -0.0023***** -0.0041*****
(0.00067) (0.00078) (0.00033) (0.00047)
Constant 0.018* 0.035**** -0.014** -0.10*****
(0.011) (0.012) (0.0054) (0.0071)
#Obs. 159,410 172,822 160,581 168,839
R2 0.047 0.116 0.292 0.056
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 21: Recipient-country-specic: same as previous table, but growth rate of the relative
South-North labor intensity as dependent variable.
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Regressions SME1 & SML1
REYsrjmt RLYsrjmt
HLr(t 3) 0.033***** -0.059*****
(0.0056) (0.0016)
XYsrjm(t 3) -0.0018***** 0.0025*****
(0.00029) (0.00018)
PErm(t 3) -0.034*****
(0.0010)
PLrm(t 3) 0.026*****
(0.0004)
Constant 0.22***** -0.13*****
(0.016) (0.0043)
#Obs. 1,310,162 1,483,623
R2 0.008 0.045
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 22: Robustness check including recipient-sector-specic factor price measures (PE for
energy and PL for labor) as regressors. Source sectors include all sectors, recipient sectors
only manufacturing sectors.
Regressions SKE1 & SKL1
REYurlkt REYurlkt RLYurlkt RLYurlkt
HLu(t 3) -0.050***** -0.069***** -0.026***** -0.045*****
(0.0065) (0.0096) (0.0049) (0.0076)
XYurlk(t 3) -0.0017*** -0.0044***** -0.0018***** -0.0045*****
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.000096)
IYul(t 3) 0.00042 0.0074* 0.0024*** 0.0095*****
(0.0013) (0.0030) (0.0009) (0.0024)
HLu(t 3) XYurlk(t 3) -0.00015*** -0.00015****
IYul(t 3) (0.000059) (0.000048)
Constant -0.15***** -0.25***** -0.089***** -0.21*****
(0.0215) (0.043) (0.0163) (0.034)
#Obs. 41,644 41,644 41,617 41,617
R2 0.0140 0.0140 0.1078 0.1090
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 23: Robustness checks including source-sector-specic R&D expenditures per output
value (IY ). Source sectors encompass a reduced sample of countries and sectors, recipient
sectors encompass only the investment (capital) good.
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